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Abstract. It has been widely recognized as a challenge to carry out
data analysis and meanwhile preserve its privacy in the cloud. In this
work, we mainly focus on a well-known data analysis approach namely
association rule mining. We found that the data privacy in this mining
approach have not been well considered so far. To address this problem,
we propose a scheme for privacy-preserving association rule mining on
outsourced cloud data which are uploaded from multiple parties in a
twin-cloud architecture. In particular, we mainly consider the scenario
where the data owners and miners have diﬀerent encryption keys that are
kept secret from each other and also from the cloud server. Our scheme
is constructed by a set of well-designed two-party secure computation
algorithms, which not only preserve the data conﬁdentiality and query
privacy but also allow the data owner to be oﬄine during the data min-
ing. Compared with the state-of-art works, our scheme not only achieves
higher level privacy but also reduces the computation cost of data
owners.
Keywords: Association rule mining · Frequent itemset mining
Privacy preserving outsourcing · Cloud computing
1 Introduction
Cloud computing has attracted more and more attentions due to its capability of
supporting real-time and massive data storing and processing. For a long time, it
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has been a growing interest in the paradigm of data mining as a service in cloud
computing [1–5]. Since internet giants such as Google and Amazon can collect
large-scale data from millions of users and devices, mining on cloud data can
also dramatically improve the accuracy and eﬀectiveness of mining. However,
when uploading data to cloud service provider, users lose control of their data.
Therefore, even though outsourcing data storage and data mining beneﬁt from
the scale of economy, it comes with the privacy and security issues.
In this work, we mainly consider the security and privacy problems exist-
ing in mining association rule on the outsourced cloud data. Frequent itemset
mining, key of association rule, is a popular data mining approach, which is usu-
ally employed to discover frequently co-occurring data items and relationships
between data items in large transaction databases. These techniques have been
widely used in market prediction, intrusion detection, network traﬃc manage-
ment and so on. For instance, if customers are buying bread, how likely are they
going to buy beer (and what kind of beer) on the same trip to the supermarket?
Such information can help retailers do selective marketing and arrange their shelf
space for increasing sales. Kantarcioglu and Clifton [6] and Vaidya and Clifton
[7] ﬁrst identiﬁed and addressed privacy issues in horizontally and vertically par-
titioned databases. Due to the increase of data security and privacy demanding,
researchers have proposed various methods on privacy-preserving association rule
mining. These works can be roughly divided into randomization-based schemes
and cryptography-based schemes. Despite the high eﬃciency in randomization-
based schemes, they suﬀer from the inaccuracy of mining result for adding ran-
dom noise to the raw data. Compared with the randomization-based scheme, the
cryptography-based scheme can apply stronger security level and accurate min-
ing result. Recently, Yi et al. [4] have proposed a privacy-preserving association
rule mining scheme on the outsourced cloud data encrypted by using ElGa-
mal homomorphic encryption scheme [8]. However, the communication cost was
huge due to the fact that their scheme needs n cloud servers to cooperate with
each other. Qiu et al. [1] proposed a framework for privacy-preserving frequent
itemset mining on encrypted cloud data in the twin-cloud architecture. Both of
Yi et al. [4] and Qiu et al. [1] designed three diﬀerent privacy level protocols,
which achieved item privacy, transaction privacy and database privacy respec-
tively. However, even in the highest security level, the mining result was still in
plaintext form to the cloud server. Li et al. [9] proposed a privacy-preserving
association rules mining system on vertically partitioned databases via a sym-
metric homomorphic encryption scheme. Their scheme achieved high eﬃciency,
but the data owners in that scheme need to stay online during the mining process
and some information about the raw data may be revealed.
Motivating Scenario. In this paper, we mainly consider a scenario where a
higher privacy level is required. In most cases, the mining result is miner’s per-
sonal property, which should be kept secret to any other entities including the
untrusted cloud server. For example, if the mining result from business data
is enterprise’s market prediction, leaking this information to competitors will
damage this enterprise’s proﬁts. In our scenario, it is required that both the raw
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data outsourced by the data owners and the mining result for the miner are
conﬁdential to the cloud server. Moreover, we consider a large number of data
owners and miners in our system, and hence supporting oﬄine users is desirable
for improving the system’s scalability. In addition, we insist that the frequent
itemset mining is the cornerstone for association rule mining. Only mining fre-
quent itemset is not enough to get the strong association rule, which is the key
to ﬁnd the relationship among itemsets. Overall speaking, in this work, we aim
at designing a secure scheme, which supports that, (1) the raw data and the
mining result are protected from other entities; (2) oﬄine users and; (3) mining
both the frequent itemset and association rule simultaneously.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving association
rule mining scheme in the twin-cloud architecture. The contributions of this
paper are four-fold, namely:
• To our best knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that studies privacy-preserving
association rule mining on encrypted data under diﬀerent keys. Our proposed
scheme allows diﬀerent data owners to outsource their data with diﬀerent
encryption keys to the cloud server for secure storage and processing.
• We build a set of cryptographic blocks for privacy-preserving association rule
mining based on BCP cryptosystem [10], which play the cornerstone of our
system.
• Based on the cryptographic blocks proposed, we construct a privacy-
preserving association rule scheme with multiple keys. And we also prove
that our scheme is secure under the semi-honest model.
• We show that our scheme can indeed achieve higher privacy level than most
of the recent works [1,4,9]. And also, we fully prove the security of our scheme
under the semi-honest mode.
We make a comparison between our work and the most recent works [1,4,9],
which is shown in Table 1. In Qiu et al.’s work [1] and Yi et al.’s work [4], they
proposed three diﬀerent privacy level protocols. Here, we just compare their
highest privacy level protocol with ours. Yi et al.’s work [4] and Qiu et al.’s work
[1] can only support frequent itemset mining. Both of their works cannot protect
the miner’s mining result privacy. Moreover, the data owners’ computation cost
is highest. Li et al.’s [9] algorithm is the most eﬃcient but cannot support the
oﬄine data owners. More importantly, their work can only achieve partial data
privacy.
Related Work. Data perturbation is widely used to protect sensitive informa-
tion when outsourcing data mining of association rule. This randomization-based
approach can be used to protect the raw data but cannot protect the mining
results. Randomization-based approach [3,5] may have unpredictable impacts on
data mining precision, due to the random noise added to the raw data. Diﬀer-
ential privacy is used to protect privacy mining the association rule. However,
the key limitation of such solutions is that the mining results are not accurate
with 100%.
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Table 1. Comparison summary
Algorithm Support
FIMa
Support
ARMb
Support
Oﬄine
D.
Privacyc
M.R.
Privacyd
DO Coste Support
multi-key
[4] Yes No Yes Yes No Medium No
[9] Yes Yes No Partial Yes Low No
[1] Yes No Yes Yes No High No
Ours Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Medium Yes
aFIM means Frequent Itemset Mining.
bARM means Association Rule Mining.
cD.Privacy means Data Privacy.
dM.R.Privacy means Mining Result Privacy.
eDO Cost means Data owner’s computation cost.
Compared with randomization-based approaches, cryptography-based
approaches usually provide a well-deﬁned security model and an exact min-
ing result for privacy-preserving data mining. Earlier works [6,7] are not eﬃ-
cient enough for the practical requirement facing the prevalent of large scale
datasets. Dong and Chen [11] employed an eﬃcient inner product protocol [12]
for evaluating association rule mining. But this solution is a two-party protocol,
which involves extensive interactions. Lai et al. [13] ﬁrst proposed a semanti-
cally secure solution for outsourcing association rule mining with both privacy
and mining privacy, but the eﬃciency is still undesirable for the practice. Yi
et al. [4] proposed a privacy-preserving association rule mining in cloud com-
puting. To mine association rule from its data, the user outsources the task to
n(≥ 2) “semi-honest” servers, which cooperate to perform mining algorithm on
encrypted data and return encrypted association rules to the user. In his work
n(≥ 2) servers are needed which cause huge communication cost. Li et al. [9]
proposed a privacy-preserving outsourced association rule mining on vertically
partitioned databases. However, their solution still leaks information about the
raw data. Most recently, Qiu et al. [1] proposed a privacy-preserving frequent
itemset mining scheme on outsourced encrypted cloud data. In their work, they
proposed three diﬀerent privacy level protocols. In their privacy level I protocol,
only the transaction database in the cloud is encrypted while the miner’s query
is in plaintext. This protocol work quite eﬃciently but without protecting the
query’s privacy. In their protocol II and protocol III, the miner’s query is pro-
tected or partial protected, but the mining result is known to cloud. For adopting
time consuming homomorphic cryptosystem BGN [14], the computation cost of
data owners is quite large in protocol II.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce essential preliminary concepts which serve as the
basis of our scheme. Table 2 lists the key notations used throughout this paper.
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2.1 Frequent Itemset Mining and Association Rule Mining
Frequent itemset mining, the key of association rule mining, is ﬁrst proposed
by Agrawal et al. [15]. Given a set of items, and a transaction databases over
these items, frequent itemsets are items which appear with frequency more than
a given number. In the following, we give the speciﬁc deﬁnition of this concept.
Table 2. Notation used
Notations Deﬁnition
pkDOi/skDOi Public/private key of data owner i
pkM/skM Public/private key of miner
pkΣ The product of all the data owners and miner’s public key
[[x]]pk Encrypted data x under pk
MK Master key of BCP cryptosystem
mDec(pk,MK)(X) Decrypt X with the master key
|x| Bit length of x
supp(X) Support of X
conf(X) Conﬁdence of X
SMAD Secure multiplication across domain
SCAD Secure comparison across domain
SC Secure comparison
SIP Secure inner product
SFIM Secure frequent itemset mining
Deﬁnition 1 (Frequent Itemset). Let I = {i1, · · · , im} be a set of items.
A transaction T is a set of items. A transaction database is denoted as T =
{t1, · · · , tm}, where m is the total number of transactions. An itemset X ⊆ I
is a set of items from I. If X ⊆ ti, X is contained by a transaction ti.
The support of itemset X, is the number of transactions containing X in T ,
which is referred as supp(X). suppmin is the user-deﬁned minimum threshold.
If supp(X) ≥ suppmin, X is the frequent itemset.
The purpose of the frequent itemset mining is to discover the frequency of the
item/itemsets, which will further be used to ﬁnd the relationship of two items.
Generally, the relationship between two items are measured by support and
conﬁdence. An association rule is of the form X ⇒ Y where X,Y ⊂ I and
X ∩ Y = ∅. The supp(X ⇒ Y ), support of the rule X ⇒ Y , is the number of
the transactions containing X ∪ Y . The conﬁdence of rule X ⇒ Y is a measure
of the relation between two items, denoted by conf(X ⇒ Y ) = supp(X ⇒
Y )/supp(X).
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Deﬁnition 2 (Strong Association Rule). Assume a minimum support
threshold suppmin and a minimum conﬁdence threshold confmin are given. The
rule X ⇒ Y is strong iﬀ supp(X ⇒ Y ) ≥ suppmin and conf(X ⇒ Y ) ≥
confmin.
Here, we illustrate the above two deﬁnition by the following example. A
transaction dataset T is given in Table 3. All the items are presented as boolean
types, i.e., an item is described as absent by 0, otherwise by 1. Suppose that, if
X = {Coke}, and Y = {Milk}, we can represent X ∪ Y as q = (0, 1, 1, 0). We
want to ﬁnd out that whether Coke ⇒ Milk is a strong association rule or not.
First, we make an inner product vi = q · ti , where ti , i ∈ (1, · · · , 5) is the row
in the table. It can be easily got that only v1 and v3 are equal to 2. Therefore,
supp(X ⇒ Y ) = 2. If supp(X ⇒ Y ) < suppmin, we can conclude that X ⇒ Y is
not the strong rule, because X ∪ Y is not a frequent itemset. Here, assume that
suppmin = 2, thus X ∪ Y is a frequent itemset. Next, we can calculate supp(X)
in the same way. In Table 3, it can be easily calculated that supp(X ⇒ Y ) = 2
and supp(X) = 3. Therefore, we can easily get conf(X ⇒ Y ) = 2/3. If the
conf(X ⇒ Y ) ≥ confmin, X ⇒ Y is the strong association rule. Otherwise, it’s
not.
Table 3. Market-basket transaction dataset T
ID Bread Coke Milk Beer
1 1 1 1 0
2 1 0 0 1
3 0 1 1 1
4 1 1 0 1
5 0 0 1 0
2.2 BCP Cryptosystem
BCP Cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic cryptosystem, proposed by
Bresson et al. [10]. BCP is a double decryption mechanism, meaning that it
oﬀers two independent decryption mechanisms. The most prominent character-
istic of such scheme is that if given the master key of this cryptosystem, any
given ciphertext can be successfully decrypted. The BCP cryptosystem works as
follows:
Setup(κ): Given a security parameter κ, choose a safe-prime RSA-modulus N =
pq (i.e., p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 for distinct primes p′ and q′, respectively)
of bitlength κ. In the following, we use |N | to denote the length of N . Then
a random element g ∈ Z∗N2 with order pp′qq′ is picked, such that gp
′q′ mod
N2 = 1+λN for λ ∈ [1, N−1]. Thus, the algorithm outputs the public parameter
PP and the master key MK as follows, PP = (N,λ, g) and MK = (p′, q′).
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KeyGen(PP): Randomly pick a ∈ Z∗N2 and compute h = ga mod N2. Then,
output the public key pk = h and secret key sk = a.
Enc(PP,pk)(m): For a given plaintext m ∈ ZN , randomly pick r ∈ ZN2 , then
output the ciphtext (A,B) as A = gr mod N2, B = hr(1 + mN) mod N2.
Dec(PP,sk)(A,B): The plaintext of the given ciphtext (A,B) and secret key
sk = a, can be calculated as m = (B/(Aa) − 1 mod N2)/N .
mDec(PP,pk,MK)(A,B): Using the master secret key MK of this cryptosys-
tem, the plaintext of the above ciphtertext (A,B) can be calculated as follows.
First compute a mod N as a mod N = (hp
′q′ − 1 mod N2)/N · k−1 mod N ,
where k−1 denotes the inverse of k modulo N . Then r mod N can be com-
puted as r mod N = (Ap
′q′ − 1 modN2)/N · k−1 mod N . Therefore, the when
a and r is obtained, the plaintext can be easily get by the following equation,
m = ((B/gar)p
′q′ − 1 mod N2)/N ·(p′q′)−1 mod N , where (p′q′)−1 is the inverse
of p′q′ modulo N .
The BCP cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, which can be veriﬁed
as Decsk ([[m1]]pk · [[m2]]pk) = m1 + m2. Note that for any given m, k ∈ ZN ,
we can easily get ([[m]]pk)k = [[k · m]]pk. Moreover, if k = N − 1, we can get
([[m]]pk)N−1 = [[−m]]pk. In this paper, for simplicity we use [[m]]pk instead of
Enc(PP,pk)(m). More proofs of the correctness and semantic security of the
BCP cryptosystem can be found in [10].
3 System Model and Design Goal
3.1 Problem Statement
Suppose that the cloud service provider has collected a large set of encrypted
transactions from data owners. A miner, who has limited transactions, wants to
mine the frequent itemsets. If mining from his own transaction database, the
mining results may not be accurate. Therefore, he need make some queries to
cloud to ﬁnd out whether the itemsets in his own database are frequent or not
in cloud’s database which is much larger. We follow the same assumption in
previous sections that each transaction is represented as a binary vector, and a
mining query is represented as another binary vector.
3.2 System Model
In our system, we focus on preserving privacy association rule mining on the
cloud. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the system model by dividing this system into
ﬁve parties: Key Generation Center (KGC), Evaluator, Cloud Service Provider
(CSP), Data Owners (DO) and Miner. The overall system model of our preserv-
ing privacy association rule mining system can be found in Fig. 1.
(1) Key Generation Center: The trusted KGC is responsible for generating
and managing both public and private keys for every party in our system
(See 1©).
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Fig. 1. System model
(2) Data Owners: Generally, the DOs use their public key to encrypt their
sensitive data, before uploading them to the CSP (See 2©).
(3) Cloud Service Provider: CSP has massive storage space. It could store
and manage data outsourced from all the DOs (See 2©). In addition, CSP has
some computation abilities to perform some calculations over the outsourced
data. In our system, the CSP provides the service of association rule mining
for the miners through cooperating with Evaluator (See 4©).
(4) Evaluator: Evaluator provides online computation in our system. It has the
master key of the BCP cryptosystem. In our system, the CSP need cooperate
with the Evaluator to mine the frequent itemsets and association rules (See
4©).
(5) Miner: In our system, Miner is the data mining service user. Data owner
can also be a miner. The miner has some transaction itemsets. The goal of
the miner is to ﬁnd the frequent itemsets and strong association rules for his
limited dataset. To achieve this purpose, he sends the encrypted itemsets to
the CSP to ﬁnd out whether they are frequent or not (See 3©). The mining
results obtained from the CSP can only be decrypted by miner himself (See
5©).
Note that the Evaluator is an essential part in our system. On one hand,
since BCP cryptosystem is not fully homomorphic, a CSP alone cannot perform
various compute operations. On the other hand, this twin-cloud architecture
composed by CSP and Evaluator, can minimize the interactions between the
request users and the cloud servers while the one cloud cannot [16]. In this
scheme, the Miner only sends encrypted queries and then remains oﬄine until
receiving the encrypted mining results.
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3.3 Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume the KGC is fully trusted by all the entities. On
the other hand, CSP, Evaluator, DOs and Miner are curious-but-honest entities,
which means that these entities intend to follow the protocols strictly and return
correct computation results, but may try to infer the private information of other
parties according to the data received and held. In addition, we also assume that
the CSP and Evaluator don’t conclude with each other. Now, we introduce an
active adversary A in this model. The goal of A is to get the original data from
the DOs and the Miner. What’s more, A also wants to know the Miner’s ﬁnal
mining results. Such an adversary has the following capabilities:
(1) A may eavesdrop all communication to obtain the encrypted data.
(2) A may compromise CSP and try to obtain all the plaintext value of the
ciphertext uploaded by the DOs and all the intermediate results sent by
Evaluator during the executing an interactive protocol.
(3) A may compromise one or more DOs to obtain their decryption abilities.
The adversary A is restricted from comprising (1) Evaluator, (2) all the DOs
and (3) the Miner. Here we remark that such restrictions are typical and widely
used in adversary model used in cryptographic protocols [1,16,17].
3.4 Design Goals
Under the aforementioned system model and attack model, our design goal is
the following four objects.
(1) The security and privacy should be guaranteed. The data uploaded by the
DOs, the query information from the Miner and the mining result from the
encrypted data contains sensitive data of themselves which could not be dis-
closed to the CSP, Evaluator or A. Meanwhile, the access pattern shouldn’t
be revealed and inferred by CSP, Evaluator or A either. Access pattern is
deﬁned as the original encrypted input corresponding to the computed value,
e.g., the comparison result, the most frequent class label, etc.
(2) Data query result’s accuracy should be guaranteed. It is also really important
that the mining accuracy must be guaranteed when applying the privacy-
preserving strategy. Therefore, the proposed system should achieve same
accuracy compared with the non-privacy-preserving data mining system.
(3) Low communication overhead and eﬃciency of computation should be guar-
anteed. Consider the real-time requirements of online service and the diver-
sity of terminals, the proposed scheme should have low overhead in terms
of communication and computation. Especially, the DOs and the Miners in
our system are usually resource-constrained users, their computation and
communication cost should be as small as possible.
(4) Oﬄine DOs and miners should be supported. After outsourcing the
encrypted data, the DOs should be oﬄine. There are many miners involved
in our system. Therefore, supporting oﬄine DOs and miners is rather nec-
essary in terms of the system’s scalability.
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4 Privacy-Preserving Frequent Itemset Mining
and Association Rule Mining
4.1 Setup
Recall that in Sect. 3 we have stated that the CSP holds a set of encrypted trans-
actions from multiple DOs. Suppose we have η DOs in our system. The KGC
generates pairs of the public and private keys (pkDOi , skDOi), i = 1, 2, · · · , η
and pkM , skM . Then, KGC distributes the individual public-private key pair
(pkDOi , skDOi) to the DO i and (pkM , skM ) to the miner, respectively. Mean-
while, the strong private key is sent to the Evaluator. Moreover, all the entities’
public keys are known to the others.
After receiving the public-private key pair from the KGC, the DOs encrypt
every record pi in his own database, and outsource these encrypted data to the
CSP. So far, the work of the DOs’ is over, meaning that all the DOs can remain
oﬄine from now on.
4.2 Privacy-Preserving Building Blocks
In this section, we propose a set of privacy-preserving building blocks, includ-
ing secure multiplication accross domains algorithm, secure inner product cal-
culation algorithm, secure comparison accross domains algorithm and secure
comparison. In Andreas et al ’s work [18], they have proposed KeyProd and
TransDec algorithm in the similiar system model based on BCP. KeyProd
and TransDec can be used to transform the encryptions under pkDOi or pkM
into encryption under pkΣ =
m∏
i=1
pkDOipkM or vice verse. For more details of
these algorithms, please see [18]. These cryptographic blocks, proposed in this
paper and Andreas et al.’s work [18], serve as the basic constructions of our
privacy-preserving association rule mining system.
Secure Multiplication Across Domains. Note that Andreas et al. [18] have
proposed a secure multiple protocol (i.e., Mult.) based on BCP cryptosystem.
Here, we present the secure multiplication across diﬀerent encryption domains
with the similar idea. For simplicity and readability, we use [[x]]pkDO instead of
[[x]]pkDOi in the following context. Suppose that CSP has encrypted data [[x]]pkDO
and [[y]]pkM . The goal of secure multiplication across domains (SMAD) algo-
rithm is to calculate [[xy]]pkΣ . We introduce the details of our SMAD algorithm
as follows.
Step 1 (CSP): (1) a, b, c, d R←− ZN .
(2) X0 = [[x]]pkDO · [[a]]pkDO , Y0 = [[y]]pkM · [[b]]pkM , X1 = [[x]]bpkDO · [[c]]pkDO ,
Y1 = [[y]]apkM · [[d]]pkM .
(3) Send X0, Y0, X1 and Y1 to Evaluator.
Step
2 (Evaluator): (1) z0 ← mDec(pkDO,MK)(X0), z1 ← mDec(pkM ,MK)(Y0),
z2 ← mDec(pkDO,MK)(X1), z3 ← mDec(pkM ,MK)(Y1).
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(2) Z1 ← [[z0 · z1]]pkΣ , Z2 ← [[z2]]N−1pkΣ , Z3 ← [[z3]]N−1pkΣ .
(3) Send Z1, Z2, Z3 to CSP.
Step 3 (CSP): (1) S1 ← ([[a · b]]pkΣ )N−1, S2 ← [[c]]pkΣ , S3 ← [[d]]pkΣ .
(2) [[xy]]pkΣ ← Z1 · Z2 · Z3 · S1 · S2 · S3.
Remark. The basic idea of SMAD is based on the following equation, i.e.,
xy = (x + a)(y + b) − (bx + c) − (ay + d) − ab + (c + d).
Secure Inner Product. Suppose that CSP has an encrypted data vector
[[x]]pkDO = ([[x1]]pkDO , · · · , [[xn]]pkDO ) and an encrypted data vector [[y]]pkM =
([[y1]]pkM , · · · , [[yn]]pkM ). For every [[xi]]pkDO and [[yi]]pkM , CSP and Evaluator
run SMAD algorithm to get [[xiyi]]pkΣ . Then, CSP multiplies all the encrypted
data. Thus, CSP can obtain [[x · y]]pkΣ = (x1y1 + · · · + xnyn)pkΣ .
Secure Comparison Across Domains. Suppose that CSP has two encrypted
data [[x]]pkM and [[y]]pkΣ , where where x, y ≤ 2l, l < |N |/2 − 1. The purpose of
CSP is to ﬁnd out whether [[x]]pkM is larger than [[y]]pkΣ or not, without leaking
the original value of x and y to Evaluator.
Step 1 (CSP): (1) A ← ([[x]]pkM )2 · [[1]]pkM , B ← ([[y]]pkΣ )2.
(2) Randomly pick a R←− {0, 1}, C ← Aa(N−1), D ← B(1−a)(N−1).
(3) Randomly choose ra, rb
R←− ZN , and calculate C ′ ← C · [[ra]]pkM , D′ ←
D · [[rb]]pkΣ . Send C ′ and D′ to Evaluator.
Step 2 (Evaluator): (1) c′ ← mDec(pkM ,MK)(C ′), d′ ← mDec(pkΣ ,MK)(D′).
(2) Calculate E ← [[c′ + d′]]pkΣ , then send E to CSP.
Step 3 (CSP): (1) F ← E · ([[ra + rb]]pkΣ )N−1.
(2) Randomly choose r1, r2, where r1, r2
R←− {1, · · · , 2l}, r2  r1, and calculate
F ′ ← F r1 · [[r2]]pkΣ . Send F ′ to Evaluator.
Step 4 (Evaluator): (1) z ← mDec(pkΣ ,MK)(F ′).
(2) If z < N/2, δ ← 1 else δ ← 0. Send [[δ]]pkΣ .
Step 5 (CSP): If a = 0, [[t]]pkΣ = [[δ]]pkΣ . Else, [[t]]pkΣ ← [[1]]pkΣ · ([[δ]]pkΣ )N−1.
Finally, CSP gets the encrypted comparison result [[t]]pkM . If t = 1, it means
x ≥ y. Otherwise, it shows x < y.
Discussion. In the secure comparison algorithm of Qiu et al ’s work [1], the
CSP sends [[r(x−y)]] directly to Evaluator ([[x]] means the encryption of x under
paillier [19]). There are several problems. First, if the decryption is 0, Evaluator
could easily know x = y. Second, according to the decryption is smaller than
N/2, the evaluator can infer whether x is smaller than y or not. Thus, we
can conclude that, the comparison result is leaked to Evaluator in the secure
comparison algorithm in Qiu et al ’s work [1]. Moreover, if x − y is a small
number, the adversary A may infer the relationship of x and y according to the
factoring result of r(x− y), i.e., one large prime and a small number. Therefore,
we can conclude the comparison algorithm in Qiu et al.’s work [1] is not secure
to the adversary either. On one hand, in order to avoid showing the relationship
of x and y, CSP should send [[r1(x′ −y′)]]pkΣ or [[r1(y′ −x′)]]pkΣ randomly, where
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x′ = 2x + 1 and y′ = 2y. If x > y, it is obvious that x′ > y′ or vice verse. On
the other hand, to keep the comparison result from the factoring of r1(x′ − y′),
CSP also blinds r1(x′ − y′) with a small random number r2, i.e., r1(x′ − y′)+ r2
before sending it to Evaluator. Since r2  r1, blinding such a number dose not
inﬂuence the comparison result of x and y.
Secure Comparison. We follow the same idea of SCAD to design the SC
algorithm. Suppose that CSP has two encrypted data [[x]]pkΣ and [[y]]pkΣ , where
x, y ≤ 2l, l < |N |/2 − 1. The purpose of CSP is to ﬁnd out whether [[x]]pkΣ
is larger than [[y]]pkΣ or not, without leaking the original value of x and y to
Evaluator. The details of the SC is as follows.
Step 1 (CSP): (1) Calculate A ← ([[x]]pkΣ )2 · [[1]]pkΣ , B ← ([[y]]pkΣ )2.
(2)Randomly pick a R←− {0, 1}, C ← Aa(N−1) · B(1−a)(N−1).
(3) Randomly choose r1, r2, where r1, r2
R←− {1, · · · , 2l}, r2  r1, and calculate
D ← Cr1 · [[r2]]pkΣ . Send D to Evaluator.
Step 2 (Evaluator): (1) z ← mDec(pkΣ ,MK)(D).
(2) If z < N/2, δ ← 1 else δ ← 0. Send [[δ]]pkΣ .
Step 3 (CSP): If a = 0, [[t]]pkΣ ← [[δ]]pkΣ . Else, [[t]]pkΣ ← [[1]]pkΣ · ([[δ]]pkΣ )N−1.
At the end of the algorithm, CSP gets the encrypted comparison result, i.e.,
[[t]]pkΣ . If t = 1, it means x ≥ y. Otherwise, we can conclude x < y.
4.3 Secure Frequent Itemset Mining
CSP, Evaluator and Miner together run this secure frequent itemset min-
ing algorithm. At the end of the algorithm, Miner gets the encrypted min-
ing results. If the decrypted data is 1, it means that the query itemset is
frequent. Otherwise, it is not. Assume that CSP holds m encrypted trans-
actions data C = {C1, · · · ,Cm }, where Cj = ([[cj,1]]pkDOi , · · · , [[cj,n]]pkDOi ),
i ∈ (1, · · · , η), j ∈ (1, · · · ,m). Miner has the encrypted mining request Q
and [[z]]pkM as well as the encrypted minimum support [[suppmin]]pkM , where
Q = ([[q1]]pkM , · · · , [[qn]]pkM ), z is the number of the 1s in Q. Evaluator has the
master key MK.
Step 1 (DO): Each DO encrypts his transactions with his own public key and
sends the encrypted data to CSP. Thus, CSP gets m encrypted transactions data
C = {C1, · · · ,Cm }, where Cj = ([[cj,1]]pkDOi , · · · , [[cj,n]]pkDOi ), i ∈ (1, · · · , η),
j ∈ (1, · · · ,m).
Step 2 (Miner): The miner uses pkM to encrypt his mining quest
and minimum support, thus obtaining Q, [[z]]pkM and [[suppmin]]pkM , where
Q = ([[q1]]pkM , · · · , [[qn]]pkM ), z is the number of the 1s in Q. Miner sends{Q, [[z]]pkM , [[suppmin]]pkM } to CSP.
Step 3 (CSP): CSP selects a dummy transactions set D = {D1, · · · ,Dk},
where Dl = (dl,1, · · · , dl,n), dl,t ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ {1, · · · , k} and t ∈ {1, · · · , n}. CSP
randomly chooses a DO’s public key pkDOi to encrypt every Dl. Then, CSP
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combines the transactions C uploaded by DOs with the dummy transaction set
D, which can be denoted as E = C
⋃
D, and E = {E1, · · · ,Ek}. Finally, CSP
runs a secret permutation function on E, E′ = π(E).
Step 4 (CSP and Evaluator): CSP and Evaluator run Keyprod together
on [[z]]pkM to get [[z]]pkΣ . After that, CSP and Evaluator run SIP together on
every transaction in the permuted database and miner’s query. Thus, CSP gets
[[xi]]pkΣ , i ∈ (1, · · · ,m + k) at the end of every round of SIP.
Step 5 (CSP): For every [[xi]]pkΣ , CSP randomly chooses an αi from Zn,
and calculates [[wi]]pkΣ ← αi([[xi]]pkΣ · ([[z]]pkΣ )(N−1)). Then, CSP sends W ={[[w1]]pkΣ , · · · , [[wm+k]]pkΣ} it to Evaluator.
Step 6 (Evaluator): Given W , the Evaluator uses MK to decrypt every
[[wi]]pkΣ . If wi = 0, set vi = 1, else vi = 0. Then, he encrypts every vi, before
sending V = ([[v1]]pkΣ , · · · , [[vm+k]]pkΣ ) to CSP.
Step 7 (CSP): On receiving V ′, CSP computes V = π−1(V ), then he removes
the dummy results and calculates [[u]]pkΣ =
m∏
i=1
v′i.
Step 8 (CSP and Evaluator): CSP and Evaluator run SCAD together on
[[suppmin]]pkM and [[u]]pkΣ and obtain the encrypted comparison result [[t]]pkΣ .
After that, CSP gets [[t]]pkM through running TransDec with Evaluator. CSP
sends it to Miner.
Step 9 (Miner): Miner decrypts the [[t]]pkM . If t = 1, the query itemset is
frequent, else it is not.
Remark. In our SFIM, the dummy transactions are needed. Without the
dummy transactions, Evaluator can deduce the support of q by counting the
number of 0s in W . With these dummy transactions, the support of q will be
covered. Since, CSP knows the inverse of the permutation function, he can use
it to remove the dummy results thus getting the original support of q.
Discussion. In Step 6 of our SFIM, Evaluator encrypts vi by pkΣ rather than
pkM . If using pkM , in Step 8, CSP and Evaluator run SC instead of SCAD.
However, the miner in our system is “honest-but-curious”. If vi is encrypted by
pkM , it could be leaked to Miner, which shouldn’t be known to him. To protect
DOs’ data privacy, all the intermediate data should be encrypted by pkΣ . For
the reason that no one has private key of pkΣ , only Evaluator is capable of
decrypting the data encrypted by pkΣ .
4.4 Secure Association Rule Mining
Getting frequent itemsets is not enough for Miner to ﬁgure out the relationship
between the itemset. In the following context, we will describe how to securely
mine association rule from the frequent itemsets. In our algorithm, the Miner is
supposed to have the threshold of conﬁdence, i.e., confmin. If the Miner expects
to know whether X ⇒ Y is strong or not, CSP just needs to give him supp(X)
and supp(X ∪ Y ). Assume that CSP has m encrypted transactions data C =
{C1, · · · ,Cm }, where Cj = ([[cj,1]]pkDOi , · · · , [[cj,n]]pkDOi ), i ∈ (1, · · · , η), j ∈
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(1, · · · ,m). The CSP also has the support of query [[u]]pkΣ from SFIM. Miner
has the frequent itemset f and the threshold of conﬁdence α/β, where f =
([[f1]]pkM , · · · , [[fn]]pkM ). Please note that, for the easiness and convenience of
comparison, we denote the threshold of conﬁdence as α/β. Evaluator has the
master key MK. The details of our SARM is given as follows.
Step 1 (Miner): (1) Get the sets of f ’s nonvoid proper subset H, where H =
{h1, · · · ,h2z−2} 1. Suppose that the number of 1s in hi is ki.
(2) Encrypt every hi , ki, α and β, where i ∈ (1, · · · , 2z − 2). Send them to CSP.
Step 2: For each i = 1 to 2z − 2,
(CSP and Evaluator): (1) The same procedure as in SFIM from Step 3 to
Step 7. At the end, CSP gets [[ui]]pkΣ .
(2) [[τi]]pkΣ ← SMAD([[β]]pkM , [[u]]pkΣ ), [[εi]]pkΣ ← SMAD([[α]]pkM , [[ui]]pkΣ ).
(3) [[γi]]pkM ← SC([[τi]]pkΣ , [[εi]]pkΣ ). Send [[γi]]pkM to the miner.
Miner: (1) γi ← DecskM ([[γi]]pkM ).
(2) If γi = 1, If γi = 1, hi ⇒ (f −hi) is a strong association rule. Else, it is not.
5 Security Analysis
5.1 Security of Cryptographic Blocks
In this section, we prove the security of SMAD, SIP, SCAD, and SC. First,
we give the deﬁnition of security in the semi-honest model in [16,20].
Deﬁnition 3 (Security in the Semi-Honest Model [20]). Let ai be the
input of party Pi, Πi(π) be Pi’s execution image of the protocol π and bi be the
output for party Pi computed from π. Then π is secure if Πi(π) can be simulated
from ai and bi such that distribution of the simulated image is computationally
indistinguishable from Πi(π) (More details can be found in [20]).
From Deﬁnition 3, we can conclude that the simulated execution image and the
actual execution image should be computational indistinguishable when proving
the security of these cryptographic blocks. In our scheme, the execution image
generally includes the data exchanged and the information computed from these
data.
Theorem 1. The SMAD proposed is secure under semi-honest model.
Proof. Here, let the execution image of Evaluator be denoted by ΠEvaluator
(SMAD) which is given by ΠEvaluator(SMAD) =
{
(X0, z0), (X1, z1), (Y0, z2),
(Y1, z3)
}
where z0 = x + a, z1 = y + b, z2 = bx + c and z3 = ay + d
1 For example, if f = {1, 1, 1, 0} which means {X,Y, Z}. The sets of f ’s nonvoid proper
subset is H = {{X}, {Y } {Z}, {X,Y }, {X,Z}, {Y, Z}}, which can be represent as
H = {{1, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 1}, {1, 1, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 1, 0}, {0, 1, 1, 0}}.
.
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are derived by decrypting X0, X1, X2 and X3 respectively. Note that a,
b, c, d are random numbers in ZN . We assume that ΠSEvaluator(SMAD) =
{(X ′0, z′0), (X ′1, z′1), (Y ′0 , z′2), (Y ′1 , z′3)} where all the elements are randomly gener-
ated from ZN . Since BCP is a semantic secure encryption scheme, (Xi, zi) is com-
putationally indistinguishable from (X ′i, z
′
i), i ∈ (0, 1, 2, 3). Meanwhile, as every
z′i is randomly chosen from ZN , zi is computationally indistinguishable from zi.
Based on the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that ΠEvaluator(SMAD)
is indistinguishable from ΠSEvaluator(SMAD).
The proof of CSP is analogous to Evaluator. Combining the above analysis,
we can conﬁrm that SMAD is secure under the semi-honest model.
Theorem 2. The SIP is secure under semi-honest model.
Proof. Our SIP is based on SMAD. Since we have proven the security of
SMAD, we can conclude that SIP is secure too.
Theorem 3. The SCAD proposed is secure under semi-honest model.
Proof. According to SCAD, the execution image of SCAD for Evaluator can be
denoted by ΠEvaluator(SCAD), which is ΠEvaluator(SCAD) = {(C ′, c′), (D′, d′),
(F ′, z), δ} where c′ = (−1)a · (2x + 1) + ra, d′ = (−1)1−a · (2y) + rb,
z = r1((−1)a · (2x + 1) + (−1)1−a · (2y)) + r2 are separately derived from
the decryption of C ′, D′, F . Note that a is a random number from (0, 1),
ra, rb are random numbers form ZN , and r1, r2 is a random number from
{1, · · · , 2l}, 22l+1 < N/2, r1  r2. In addition, δ is the comparison result
from z. We assume ΠSEvaluator(SCAD) = {(C ′′, c′′), (D′′, d′′), (F ′′, z′), δ′} where
(C ′′, c′′), (D′′, d′′), (F ′′, z′) are randomly generated from ZN , and δ′ is set to 1
or 0 according to the randomly tossed coin. Since BCP is a semantically secure
encryption scheme, (C ′, c′), (D′, d′), (F ′, z) are computationally indistinguish-
able from (C ′′, c′′), (D′′, d′′), (F ′′, z′). Furthermore, because the element a is
randomly chosen from {0, 1}, δ is either 0 or 1 with equal probability. Thus,
δ is computationally indistinguishable from δ′. Combining the above results,
we can claim that ΠEvaluator(SCAD) is computationally indistinguishable from
ΠSEvaluator(SCAD).
On the other hand, the execution image of CSP, denoted by ΠCSP (SCAD),
is given by ΠEvaluator(SCAD) = {E, [[δ]]pkΣ}. Let the simulated image of CSP
be given by ΠSEvaluator(SCAD) = {E′, α}, where E′, α are random numbers
from ZN . Since BCP is semantically secure encryption scheme, E, and [[δ]]pkΣ
are computationally indistinguishable from E′, and α. Thus, we can conclude
that ΠCSP (SCAD) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSCSP (SCAD).
Based on the above analysis, we can claim that SCAD is secure under the
semi-honest model.
Theorem 4. The SC described is secure under semi-honest model.
Proof. Since SC is designed by the similar idea of SCAD, we can easily get the
proof from Theorem 3.
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5.2 Security of SFIM and SARM
Theorem 5. The SFIM proposed is secure under semi-honest model and also
can preserve the data conﬁdentiality and query privacy against active adversary.
Proof. In the similar maner we can prove that our SFIM is secure under the
semi-honest model ﬁrstly. In Step 1 to Step 2, DOs and Miner send C and Q,
[[z]]pkM , [[suppmin]]pkM to CSP. Due to the semantic security of BCP, the semi-
honest CSP has no advantage to distinguish them from random numbers from
ZN . In Step 3, the CSP randomly chooses a dummy transactions set and encrypts
it with a random public key from DOs. Then, he mixes it with the original
dataset uploaded from DOs. After that, CSP and Evaluator run the SIP. Since
the Evaluator cannot distinguish the original dataset and the dummy data and
the security proof of SIP, we can conﬁrm the protocol is secure in Step 3 and
Step 4. Furthermore, the data operation in Step 5 to Step 7 is similar to the
process of SMAD, all the exchanged messages are in encrypted format, and
each value deduced by CSP and Evaluator is blinded by random numbers. In
Step 8, the SCAD, TransDec are adopted as the fundamental building blocks,
which has been proved secure in previous section and [18]. In Step 9, CSP and
Miner just deal with encrypted data, the security is from the semantic security
of BCP. As a result, we can easily conclude that our SFIM is secure under the
semi-honest model.
Next, we discuss the data conﬁdentiality and query privacy against an active
adversary A. Assume that A eavesdrops the transmission link between DOs and
CSP, the encrypted database and all the intermediate data is got by A. Because
all the data is encrypted by BCP, A cannot get the original data. If A comprises
some DOs and gets their private keys, they still cannot decrypt the Miner’s query
since the encryption key is diﬀerent. As long as the evaluator is not comprised
all the data conﬁdentiality and query privacy deﬁned is satisﬁed.
As a result, we can claim that our SFIM is secure under semi-honest model
and also can preserve the data conﬁdentiality and query privacy against active
adversary.
Theorem 6. The SARM described in Sect. 4.4 is secure under semi-honest
model and also can preserve the data conﬁdentiality and query privacy against
active adversary.
It is worth noting that the proofs are similar to Theorem 5 and hence we omit
it due to the space limitation.
6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme. In [10], the author
also proposed a variant of the original BCP cryptosystem, where the randomness
r is chosen in a smaller set, namely in ZN rather than ZN2 . The variant of
the original BCP cryptosystem is secure based on the Small Decisional Diﬃe-
Hellman Assumption (S-DDH) over a squared composite modulus of the form
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N = pq. (More details of S-DDH and the security analysis can be found in [10])
In this section, we will analyse the performance of our system based on BCP
and the variant of BCP.
6.1 Experiment Analysis
The performance evaluations of the proposed system are tested on ﬁve laptop
computers running Windows 8.1 with Intel Core I5-5200U 2.20GHz CPU and
4GB RAM. We implement BCP and its variant cryptosystem by BigInteger
Class in Java development kit, and using this to implement our computation
protocols. Specially, two of them are acted as the DOs, which encrypt the data
and upload them to CSP; one is used as the Miner, and the rest of them are
leveraged as the CSP and Evaluator respectively. In our experiment, we ﬁrst
test the eﬃciency of our cryptographic blocks. Then, we make an eﬃciency
comparison with the most recent work [1] over the same chess database2 as
our transaction dataset, which totally has 3196 transactions and 75 attributes.
Moreover, we analyse the performance of the schemes by varying parameters.
Table 4. Performance of cryptographic blocks (100-times for average, 80-bits security
level)
Algorithm CSP
Compute.
Evaluator
Compute.
CSP Commu. Evaluator
Commu.
SMAD 0.391 s 0.368 s 1.998KB 1.499KB
SCAD 0.398 0.214 s 1.498KB 0.999KB
SC 0.137 0.098 s 0.498KB 0.499KB
SIP (10 bits Vector) 3.951 s 3.822 s 19.991KB 14.991KB
Eﬃciency of Cryptographic Blocks. We ﬁrst evaluate the performance of
the basic cryptographic blocks, which can be seen in Table 4. For the BCP algo-
rithm, we denote N as 1024 bits to achieve 80-bit security [21] levels. We can
observe from Table 4 that in the SMAD algorithm the computation of CSP costs
0.391 s and he sends 1.998KB data when communicating with Evaluator, while
Evaluator needs 0.368 s to complete the computation and the communication
will cost 1.499KB. Moreover, in the SCAD algorithm, the CSP needs 0.398 s to
compute and send 1.498KB data to Evaluator, while the Evaluator needs 0.214 s
to compute and send 0.999KB data. In the SC algorithm, the CSP costs 0.137 s
for computing and sends 0.498KB data to Evaluator, while the Evaluator needs
0.098 s to compute and send 0.499KB data. We also test SIP over two 10-bit
vectors, we can see from Table 4, the cost of CSP and Evaluator is almost ten
times of single SMAD.
We also test our scheme based on the variant of the BCP cryptosystem. The
running result can be found in Table 5.
2 http://ﬁmi.ua.ac.be/data/.
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Table 5. Performance of cryptographic blocks based on the variant BCP (100-times
for average, 80-bits security level)
Algorithm CSP
Compute.
Evaluator
Compute.
CSP Commu. Evaluator
Commu.
SMAD 0.297 s 0.251 s 1.998KB 1.498KB
SCAD 0.254 0.171 s 1.499KB 0.999KB
SC 0.083 0.063 s 0.499KB 0.499KB
SIP (10 bits Vector) 2.301 s 3.102 s 19.981KB 14.989KB
Eﬃciency Comparison. For a fair comparison, we also implement Qiu et al.’s
work [1] in Java by BigInteger Class in Java development kit and JPBC library3.
We choose | p |= 160 bits with at least 80-bit security with Type A pairing in
BGN and N as 1024 bits in Paillier [19]. We ﬁrst make a comparison about the
data encryption and uploading and then the frequent itemset mining protocol is
compared.
Performance of Data Encryption and Uploading. Note that the data
encryption is done in oﬀ-line by the DOs. In most conditions, the DOs are
resource-constrained users. The performance of data encryption is shown in
Fig. 2(a) and the uploading communication costs are shown Fig. 2(b).
As shown in Fig. 2, the running time of data encryption by BCP is much
less than BGN, and the BCP variant’s is more less, while both of them are
higher than the Paillier’s running time. The communication cost of BCP and
BCP varinat is almost same which is larger than Paillier and BGN. Since most
of the DOs are resource-constrained, our scheme extensively reduce the DOs’
computation cost than [1]’s protocol 2, but with slight higher communication
cost.
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3 http://gas.unisa.it/projects/jpbc.
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Table 6. Cloud computation time (in minutes) of frequent itemset mining
Protocol 2 Our protocol based on BCP Our protocol based on BCP variant
1354.021 4321.612 2930.398
Performance of Frequent Itemset Mining. We test the cloud’s (including
CSP and Evaluator) running time in our scheme and [1]’s protocol on the Chess
dataset. The overall running time is shown in Table 6. In our experiment, the
size of dummy transactions in all of the protocols is m/2. From Table 6, we can
conclude that our protocol is slower than [1]’s protocol 2. Since our protocol
achieves higher privacy level, we think it is reasonable. In addition, if we use the
BCP variant as the basic cryptosystem in our scheme, the running time can be
largely reduced. What’s more, the cloud is usually has “unlimited” computing
resource and power, the running time of our scheme can be dramatically reduced
in real cloud system.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a practical privacy-preserving frequent itemset mining
and association rule mining protocol on encrypted cloud data. Compared with
the state-of-art works, our scheme achieves higher privacy level, and also reduces
the data owners’ computation cost. The computation cost in cloud is higher than
Qiu et al.’s work [1]. Since the cloud has massive computation resource, the
computation time in real cloud service will be quite small. In our future work,
we will focus on further improving the eﬃciency of our scheme.
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